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Abstract
Protocol reverse engineering is the process of extracting
application-level speciﬁcations for network protocols. Such
speciﬁcations are very useful in a number of security-related
contexts, for example, to perform deep packet inspection and
black-box fuzzing, or to quickly understand custom botnet
command and control (C&C) channels. Since manual re-
verse engineering is a time-consuming and tedious process,
a number of systems have been proposed that aim to auto-
mate this task. These systems either analyze network trafﬁc
directly or monitor the execution of the application that
receives the protocol messages. While previous systems show
that precise message formats can be extracted automatically,
they do not provide a protocol speciﬁcation. The reason is
that they do not reverse engineer the protocol state machine.
In this paper, we focus on closing this gap by presenting
a system that is capable of automatically inferring state
machines. This greatly enhances the results of automatic
protocol reverse engineering, while further reducing the
need for human interaction. We extend previous work that
focuses on behavior-based message format extraction, and
introduce techniques for identifying and clustering different
types of messages not only based on their structure, but also
according to the impact of each message on server behavior.
Moreover, we present an algorithm for extracting the state
machine. We have applied our techniques to a number of
real-world protocols, including the command and control
protocol used by a malicious bot. Our results demonstrate
that we are able to extract format speciﬁcations for different
types of messages and meaningful protocol state machines.
We use these protocol speciﬁcations to automatically gen-
erate input for a stateful fuzzer, allowing us to discover
security vulnerabilities in real-world applications.
1. Introduction
Reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a device
or a system to understand its structure and functionality.
In the context of network protocols, reverse engineering de-
scribes the process of deriving the application-level protocol
speciﬁcation of an unknown protocol. To this end, an analyst
can monitor the exchange of messages over a network or
observe how the communication end-points (such as client
and server) process network input. The detailed knowledge
of a protocol speciﬁcation is important for addressing a
number of security problems.
Given a protocol speciﬁcation, it can be used to generate
protocol fuzzers [1] that perform black-box vulnerability
analysis of network applications. In fact, many vulnera-
bilities have been found in the past that resulted from
programming errors in protocol parsing code [2]. More-
over, detailed protocol speciﬁcations are required by intru-
sion detection systems (e.g., Bro [3]) that perform deep
packet inspections. Also, the ability to generate protocol
speciﬁcations is useful for generic protocol analyzers that
require protocol grammars as input (e.g., binpac [4] and
GAPA [5]). Furthermore, protocol reverse engineering can
help to identify (subtle) variations in the way that different
applications implement the same protocol. These differences
can be used for application ﬁngerprinting [6] or to discover
security vulnerabilities [7]. Finally, the analysis of malware
is another important area where protocol reverse engineering
can be applied. Botnets [8] increasingly make use of non-
standard communication protocols [9], [10]. For a security
analyst who attempts to understand and take down botnets,
the ability to automatically reverse engineer the command
and control protocol is clearly helpful.
In general, reverse engineering is largely a manual, te-
dious, and time-consuming process. To support a human
analyst with this task, a number of automatic protocol
reverse engineering techniques have been proposed. These
techniques aim to automatically generate the speciﬁcations
of an application-level protocol. Two possible input sources
can be used to analyze a protocol: network trafﬁc and an
application that implements the protocol.
A number of approaches [11]–[14] have been presented
that use network trafﬁc as input. These systems typically
analyze traces generated by recording the communicationbetween a client and a server. Then, heuristics are applied
to extract different protocol ﬁelds and delimiters. Although
useful in practice, the precision of these systems is often
limited. That is, it is not always possible to extract all
required information about a protocol from the network
trafﬁc alone. To address the limited precision of techniques
that operate directly on the network traces, a number
of systems [15]–[18] were introduced that focus on the
(server) application. More precisely, these systems operate
by observing the execution of the application while it is
processing input messages. This allows them to infer the
structure of a message (i.e., its constituent ﬁelds) with
higher precision, and it provides insight into ﬁeld semantics
that are not available to network-trace-based approaches. A
common property of all previous systems (whether network-
or behavior-based) is that they only extract the format of
individual protocol messages.That is, these systems do not
aim at reverse engineering the protocol state machine, and,
therefore, cannot produce speciﬁcations for stateful network
protocols.
In this paper, we introduce Prospex (Protocol Speciﬁ-
cation Extraction), a system that can automatically infer
speciﬁcations for stateful network protocols, i.e. including
state machine information. To the best of our knowledge,this
is the ﬁrst system with this capability. Our analysis builds
upon a system introduced in previous work [17], which can
extract the format speciﬁcations of individual messages by
monitoring the application as it processes its inputs. For
this paper, our system was extended in two main directions.
First, we developed a mechanism to identify messages of the
same type. This information is leveraged to combine similar
messages into clusters. The second extension is related to
the inference of a protocol state machine. The protocol state
machine encodes all sequences of messages that are permit-
ted by the protocol. Information about the state machine is
required to be able to engage in a “meaningful” conversation
with a communication partner, e.g., knowing when a certain
message can be sent.
In summary, the contributions of this work are the fol-
lowing:
• We propose several features to determine when two
messages in a network session are similar. These fea-
tures take into account not only the format of messages,
but also the effect that receiving each message has
on server execution. This allows us to automatically
identify and cluster messages of the same type. Auto-
matically recognizing different message types allows us
to use a set of messages of the same type to generate
a corresponding message format speciﬁcation.
• We present a technique to automatically infer the proto-
col state machine. This state machine speciﬁes the order
in which messages can be exchanged, given no prior
knowledge about the protocol under analysis. We fur-
ther show that our technique consistently outperforms
existing approaches for state machine inference.
• We applied our system to a number of real-world
applications that implement complex, stateful protocols.
The results demonstrate that our techniques are capable
of extracting meaningful message formats and protocol
state machines. This is true both for protocols used by
benign applications (such as SMTP, Samba, or SIP) and
protocols used by malicious software (such as the C&C
protocol used by Agobot).
• We leverage the output of our system to automatically
produce protocol speciﬁcations for the open-source
Peach fuzzing platform [19]. To this end, we actively
contributed to the development of Peach and extended
its support for stateful protocols. Running Peach with
our speciﬁcations allowed us to automatically ﬁnd
vulnerabilities in real-world applications.
2. System Description
The input to our system are a number of application
sessions. An application session is a connection between
hosts that allows the involved machines to exchange data.
Each session typically consists of a sequence of messages.
Each of these messages has a message type, which is deﬁned
by a message format speciﬁcation. The message format
speciﬁes the structure of a message, typically as a number
of ﬁelds. The structure of the whole application session is
determined by the protocol state machine. The protocol state
machine deﬁnes the order in which messages of different
types can be sent.
The objective of our system is to automatically infer the
speciﬁcation of an unknown protocol that a client uses to
communicate with a server. More precisely, given a sequence
of messages that a client sends to a server, we are interested
in the speciﬁcations of these messages, as well as the
protocol state changes that these messages result in.
To this end, our system proceeds in several phases, as
shown in Figure 1.
Dynamic taint analysis. In this phase, dynamic data tainting
is used to observe the application as it processes incoming
messages. The resulting executiontraces show the operations
performed on data that was read from the network.
Session analysis. Initially, we analyze these execution
traces, splitting them into individual messages. Then, we
perform message format inference on each message, result-
ing in detailed format speciﬁcations for single messages.
Message clustering. We extract a number of features for
each message from the execution trace. These features take
into account the previously inferred message formats as well
as the effect of each message on the application’s behavior.
The similarity between messages is determined using these
features. Then, we apply the partitioning around medoidsInput data
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Figure 1. System overview.
(PAM) clustering algorithm [20] to group similar messages
into types. Finally, we derive a generalized message format
speciﬁcation for each type.
State machine inference. In this phase, we infer a state ma-
chine that models the order in which messages of different
types may be sent. Initially, we construct a state machine that
accepts exactly the sequences of messages observed during
training. Then, we use a novel algorithm, based on domain-
speciﬁc heuristics, to label the states of this state machine.
States that may be similar are assigned identical labels.
Finally, we apply the Exbar [21] algorithm to producea more
general, minimal state machine by merging similar states.
Together with the generalized message format speciﬁcations
for the different types of messages, this minimal state
machine represents the reverse-engineered network protocol.
Fuzzing. Optionally, our tool can translate the extracted
protocol speciﬁcations into input for the Peach fuzzing
platform [19]. As we will show in Section 3, this allows
Peach to test code that is only accessible in later protocol
stages, ﬁnding “deeper” security vulnerabilities in real-world
applications.
2.1. Session Analysis
The purpose of the session analysis phase is to auto-
matically retrieve the message format speciﬁcations for the
messages that are passed between client and server within an
application session. To this end, we leverage an observation
that was exploited in previous work [15], [17] for the
analysis of individual messages. This observation suggests
that it is advantageous to monitor how a program processes
its input messages instead of analyzing the trafﬁc that is
exchanged between hosts at the network-level, because this
allows more precise inference of message formats. By using
dynamic taint analysis [22]–[24], we can precisely track how
the application, which “understands” the messages and im-
plements the protocol state machine, handles input data. As
a result of the session analysis phase, we obtain a sequence
of messages for an application session, each represented as a
tree of high-level messages ﬁelds. Previous work on message
format inference includes systems that analyze either single
inputs [15], [16] or, more generally, multiple inputs [17],
[18]. Our current implementation extends work from [17]
and automatically splits sessions into sequences of messages.
Thus, the need for human assistance during this phase is
removed.
Like previous work, our system is not capable of reverse
engineering encrypted trafﬁc. While this is an intrinsic
limitation of approaches that only analyze network trafﬁc, it
could be overcome by systems that observe server behavior.
For this, one could manually or automatically [25] identify
buffers that hold decrypted messages and then use these
buffers as a starting point for the analysis.
The following paragraphs outline the steps performed by our
system to retrieve the message formats.
Recording execution traces. Initially, we execute the appli-
cation that implements the protocol that we are interested in
(e.g., a server program). The program is run in a controlled
environment that supports dynamic data tainting [22]–[24].
This allows us to record all operations that involve data read
from protocol messages. Then, we engage the server in a
series of application sessions, typically by connecting with
a client program, performing some common tasks.
In this paper, we limit ourselves to the analysis of the
communication in a single direction. That is, we infer the
protocol state machine only for one of the communication
partners. Also, we only determine the speciﬁcations of the
messages that this communication partner receives. For ease
of presentation, we will refer to this communication partner
as “server,” and to the other as “client.” Note that it would
be possible to use our techniques to simultaneously monitor
both the client and the server, eventually combining the two
different state machines and sets of message formats.
With dynamic data tainting, the system assigns a unique
label to each input byte and tracks the propagation of these
labels throughout the execution of the program. The outputof this step is, for each application session, an execution
trace that contains all executed instructions as well as the
taint labels of all instruction operands.
Splitting a session into messages. The execution traces that
we record contain all instructions that are executed during an
application session. As the next step, this trace needs to be
split according to the individual messages. Since we assume
no prior knowledge of message boundaries, we use a simple
heuristic: The ﬁrst message starts with the ﬁrst input byte
that the server receives. All subsequent input is considered to
be part of this message. This continues until the server writes
data to the socket from where it had received the input (that
is, the server sends a reply). The next byte received from the
client is considered to denote the start of the next message.
This is repeated until all execution traces are split into
segments, where each segment corresponds to one message.
While this approach is not fully general, it is signiﬁcantly
more accurate than considering each network packet as a
message by itself. The reason is that clients sometimes break
a message into several packets (for example, interactive
protocols). The server collects these packets until a complete
message has arrived before a response is sent. Our heuristic
correctly handles this case and combines multiple packets
into a single message.
Inferring message formats. Once our system has identiﬁed
an execution trace segment for each protocol message, we
use the techniques presented in previous work [15], [17]
to determine the format of each message. Using these
techniques, we analyze an execution trace segment and split
the corresponding message into ﬁelds. As a result, each
message is represented as a tree of ﬁelds with associated
semantics (i.e., delimited ﬁeld, length ﬁeld, pointer ﬁeld,
keyword, ﬁle name, etc.). The output of the session analysis
step is a sequence of messages for each application session.
Each message is represented as a tree of nested ﬁelds.
2.2. Message Clustering
After the session analysis phase, the system has extracted
a format speciﬁcation for every individual message. How-
ever, there is no information about similarities between
messages or their types.
Previous systems that perform message format inference
operate on messages of a single, known type. However,
our goal is to infer a protocol speciﬁcation assuming no
prior knowledge about message types (in fact, we do not
even know a priori how many message types there are for
a certain protocol). Therefore, we require a step that can
recognize the types of different messages.
Thus, the goal of the message clustering phase is to assign
a type to each message. To this end, we deﬁne a metric of
similarity between messages, and use it to cluster together
similar messages. Our similarity metric is based on the
assumption that messages of the same type share similar
message formats and that the server “reacts” in a similar
fashion upon receiving them. Thus, in addition to comparing
message formats, we propose a number of similarity features
that are based on the analysis of the application’s actions as
it processes different messages. Once all similar messages
are clustered, we label each cluster (and all corresponding
messages) with a type.
By assigning types to messages, we can operate on a
more abstract representation of protocol sessions. Moreover,
for each cluster, we generate a generalized message format
speciﬁcation that describes all messages in this cluster.
2.2.1. Feature Extraction and Similarity Computation.
To be able to cluster related messages, we require a way to
assess their similarity. For this, we introduce a number of
features and corresponding distance functions that allow our
system to calculate the similarity between two messages.
These features can be divided into three groups that are
discussed in the following paragraphs. For each feature, we
compute a normalized similarity score between 0 (meaning
completely different) and 1 (meaning identical).
Input similarity. Clearly, when comparing two messages,
the structure and order of the ﬁelds that these messages
are composed of play an important role. That is, we would
assume that two messages of the same type also contain
similar ﬁelds in a similar order. To capture this intuition,
we use a sequence alignment algorithm (the Needleman-
Wunsch algorithm [26], to be more precise). The goal of this
algorithm is to take two sequences as input and ﬁnd those
parts that are similar, respecting the order of the elements.
These similar parts are then aligned, exposing differences or
missing elements in the sequences. In our case, we use the
sequences of ﬁelds that each message is composed of. For
more details on how the comparison between two messages
is implemented, we refer the reader to [17].
Execution similarity. In addition to the format of the input
messages, we also expect that messages of the same type are
handled by similar code in the application. That is, when a
message of a certain type is received and processed, we as-
sume that the program uses the same code fragments, library
calls, and system calls, at least to a certain degree. This
intuition is captured by the following execution similarity
features, which can be directly derived from the recorded
execution traces.
• System call feature: This feature takes into account the
types of system calls (as indicated by their system call
number) that were invoked during the processing of a
message. These system calls are stored as a set, that is, the
order is not taken into account for this feature.
• Process activity feature: This feature is related to the
system call feature, but focuses on system calls related to
the generation or destruction of processes (such as cloneand kill). Process-activity-related system calls are typically
very indicative for the behavior of an application. When
considered together with all other system calls (as part of
the previous feature), these calls would not have sufﬁcient
weight in the similarity calculation.
• Invoked function feature: For this feature, we store in a
set the target addresses of call operations that are executed
during the processing of a message (if these addresses are
within the application’s text segment).
• Invoked library functions feature: This feature is used to
track (dynamically-linked) library calls that are made by an
application. To capture this feature, we record the target
addresses of call operations that are outside the program’s
text segment. In the case of statically-linked binaries, we
would recognize a library call as a regular function call.
• Executed addresses feature: For this feature, we use the
set of addresses of instructions that are executed by the
application while it is processing a speciﬁc message (if these
addresses are within the application’s text segment).
For each of the execution features listed above, we record
a set of numbers or addresses that are associated with a
certain message. To compare two messages, we employ the
Jaccard index [27] to determine the similarity between two
features, deﬁned as:
J(a,b) =
|a ∩ b|
|a ∪ b|
In the equation above, a is the set of elements associated
with a feature of the ﬁrst message, while b is the set that
represents the same feature of the second message. Clearly,
J(a,b) yields 0 when the sets are disjoint and 1 when they
are identical. Note that we calculate ﬁve execution similarity
scores, one for each of the ﬁve execution features.
Impact similarity. The last group of features captures
the response of the server to a message that is received.
Typically, a server application will execute a series of actions
when receiving a (legitimate) request from a client. The goal
of the following two impact similarity features is to represent
some of these actions at a high level of abstraction.
• Output feature. This feature captures the output behavior
of the server while processing a message. In particular, we
are interested in all system calls that cause the server to
write out data. More precisely, we consider the following
four destinations for data write operations: the socket to
which the client is connected, other network sockets, ﬁles,
and the terminal. The socket to which the client is connected
captures cases in which data is returned to the client (thus
ending the message, as explained in Section 2.1), while other
network sockets refer to cases in which a server sends data
over a different connection. File and terminal destinations
simply represent operations where the application writes data
to one of these sinks.
For each write operation, we also analyze the taint status
of the data that is written. This allows us to distinguish be-
tween operations that write tainted data (i.e., data previously
received from the client) and those that write other data. We
then label each byte of output with a tuple  sink, tainted 
that speciﬁes where the data was written to and whether
it was tainted or not. The output feature is represented
by a sequence of such tuples, with consecutive duplicates
removed.
Finally, we use the Needleman-Wunsch sequence alignment
algorithm to compare output sequences, as for the input
similarity. The result is the output similarity score.
• File system feature. This feature captures the ﬁle system
activity of the server when handling an input message.
Therefore, we consider system calls that perform ﬁle system
actions, such as opening or closing a ﬁle, or obtaining
information about a ﬁle or directory. In a ﬁrst step, we
represent the ﬁle system activity as a set of  operation, path 
tuples, where operation is one of {open, close, read, write,
rename, stat, mkdir, rmdir}, and path is the path of the
ﬁle that the system call operates on.
The name of the ﬁle or directory on which a system call
operates may be speciﬁc to the individual execution trace,
and, therefore, needs to be generalized. Speciﬁcally, we look
for preﬁxes of the path that are either hardcodedin the binary
(by scanning for strings in the program’s ﬁle on disk) or are
found in one of the program’s conﬁguration ﬁles (if provided
by an analyst). We can also detect those parts of a path
that are tainted, and as such, represent a parameter of a
client request. To perform generalization of a path, we ﬁrst
attempt to look for the longest preﬁx that matches a string
that is found in the binary. The remaining parts are then
replaced with one of the special tokens TAINT, CONFIG, or
VARIABLE. The VARIABLE token is used for all parts that
are neither tainted nor appear in a conﬁguration ﬁle.
As a result of the previous step, the ﬁle system
feature is represented by a set of tuples, for
example,  open, ”/CONFIG/TAINT”  or  write,
”/var/log/samba/VARIABLE” . To compute the similarity
measure between the ﬁle system features of two messages,
we use the Jaccard index, as for the execution similarities.
2.2.2. Clustering. Based on the features and similarity
functions described in the previous section, we compute the
distance between a pair of messages a and b as d(a,b) = 1− P
i wisi(a,b), where si is the similarity measure for feature
i, and
P
i wi = 1. The weights wi are selected in such a
way that each of the three groups of features described above
has the same overall weight of 1
3, and that features in the
same group have equal weight. Once a distance matrix is
computed, we can use off-the-shelf clustering techniques to
classify our data. Speciﬁcally, we employ the partitioning
around medoids (PAM) algorithm [20].
Like most partitioning-based clustering techniques, the
PAM algorithm takes as input the number k of clusters to
generate. To determine a suitable value for k, we employ ageneralization of the Dunn index. The Dunn index [28] is a
standard intrinsic measure of clustering quality, deﬁned as:
D(k) =
min1≤i≤k{min1≤j≤k{δ(Ci,Cj)}}
max1≤i≤k{∆(Ci)}
(1)
where C1,..,Ck are the clusters, ∆(Ci) is the diameter of
cluster Ci, and δ(Ci,Cj) is the distance between the two
clusters. Since the numerator of Equation 1 is a measure of
cluster separation, while the denominator is a measure of
cluster compactness, k should be chosen so that the Dunn
index is maximized. To compute the distance between two
clusters (δ in Equation 1), we use the single-linkage distance
deﬁned as δ(Ci,Cj) = mina∈Ci,b∈Cj{d(a,b)}. To compute
the diameter of a cluster (∆ in Equation 1), we use one of
the measures deﬁned in [29], which is based on Relative
Neighborhood Graphs. Once clustering has been performed,
we derive a format speciﬁcation for each message type by
merging the formats of all messages in the corresponding
cluster. This merging step leverages techniques from [17].
2.3. State Machine Inference
The previous clustering phase identiﬁes similar messages
in application sessions, assigning a different type to each
cluster. As a result, each session si can be represented as
a sequence Si = (σ1,..,σh), where σ1,..,σh ∈ M and M
is the set of message types. The goal of the state machine
inference phase is to infer an acceptor machine that can
recognize sequences of message types that represent valid
sessions of the protocol under analysis. Unfortunately, this
problem cannot be solved exactly, even if we assume that
the language comprising all valid sequences is a regular
language. The reason is that Gold [30] has proved that a
regular language cannot be learned from positive examples
only. Moreover, the problem is even more difﬁcult for more
powerful languages.
A commonly-used approach to infer a regular language
from a labeled training set (a labeled training set is a
set of example strings, labeled accept or reject), is to
ﬁnd the smallest automaton that is consistent with that
training set [31]. Such an approach selects the simplest,
most-generic hypothesis consistent with the observations.
Unfortunately, this technique cannot be directly applied to
our problem. The reason is that only positive examples are
available (all sessions are labeled accept), therefore, the
minimal automaton consistent with our training set accepts
all possible sequences of message types. To avoid such an
over-generalization, we need to restrict the hypothesis space
using domain-speciﬁc knowledge.
2.3.1. Augmented Preﬁx Tree Acceptor (APTA). As men-
tioned previously, the input to the state machine inference
phase is a set Λ of message sequences Si, where each Si
represents one observed application session. In a ﬁrst step,
we can represent the set Λ as an augmented preﬁx tree
acceptor (APTA) T [31].
An APTA is an incompletely-speciﬁed deterministic ﬁ-
nite state automaton (DFA), with a state transition graph
that is a tree. The root of the tree is the initial state
of the DFA, and each branch represents an application
session. As an example, consider that we observe two
application sessions of the Agobot malware. The sequences
of the message types of these two sessions are: (login,
bot.dns, bot.status, mac.logout) and (login, mac.logout,
login, bot.status, bot.dns, mac.logout). The APTA for this
example is shown in Figure 2. States of T may be labeled
either accept, or reject. In our example, all states are labeled
accept (marked with an “A”) because any preﬁx of a valid
protocol session is also a valid session (if this were not
the case, only the two ﬁnal states would be accept states,
and other states would be unlabeled). T is an incompletely-
speciﬁed acceptor DFA that accepts only the sequences in
the training set (and their preﬁxes). For any other sequence,
the result is unspeciﬁed.
The APTA T is used as a starting point to ﬁnd the protocol
state machine. This is done by ﬁnding the minimal DFA
that is consistent with T. To ﬁnd such a DFA, we can
leverage existing algorithms (such as Exbar [21]) that start
from T and successively merge pairs of states. Clearly, states
with different labels can never be merged. However, in our
training set, all states of T are labeled accept. Thus, the
result of directly applying an existing algorithm would be an
over-general DFA with only a single state. To address this
problem, we introduce an algorithm that assigns different
labels to the states of T (discussed in the next Section 2.3.2).
This restricts the possible merges, since only states with
the same label may be merged. Finally, we use Exbar to
obtain a minimal DFA that is consistent with that labeling,
as discussed in Section 2.3.3. This minimal DFA represents
our state machine.
2.3.2. State Labeling Algorithm. The goal of the state
labeling algorithm is to ﬁnd states in the APTA that are
different. By assigning different labels to these states, we
can prevent them from being merged. To this end, we lever-
age the observation that a common pattern in application
layer network protocols is that a message or a sequence
of messages must be sent before the server can perform
certain actions. As an example, in the Agobot command and
control protocol, a login is required before other commands
become available. In SMB/CIFS, a “TREE CONNECT”
operation must be performed to connect to a share before
ﬁle operations can be issued. In addition, certain commands
may lead the server away from a state where it can perform
these actions. For instance, a logout command in Agobot or
a “TREE DISCONNECT” in SMB/CIFS make previously
available commands impossible to execute.A A
login
A bot.dns
A
mac.logout
A
bot.status
A
mac.logout
A
login
A
bot.status
A
bot.dns
A
mac.logout
Figure 2. APTA for the Agobot example.
Our state labeling algorithm attempts to identify states
that represent similar application conditions. That is, we
attempt to identify cases in which an application can process
similar commands, based on the sequence of messages that it
previously received. To this end, we extract simple patterns
from the observed application sessions. These patterns have
the form of regular expressions on sequences of message
types. More precisely, each pattern has the form:
. ∗ r(a1|..|aj)∗, (r,a1,..,aj ∈ M) (2)
where “∗” means zero or more repetitions of the previous
term and “.” matches any message type. We call such a
pattern a prerequisite.
A prerequisite requires that, for the server to be in a state
where it can meaningfully process a message of type m, it
must ﬁrst receive a message of type r, optionally followed
only by messages in the set Ar = a1,..,aj.
The message of type r is a message that always occurs
before m. That is, in all application sessions, a message of
type r was found before m. This is to capture the case where
a connect or login message must be sent before message m.
Note that Equation 2 allows messages of any type to occur
before r (including more occurrences of r).
The set of optional messages Ar is the set of all messages
that, in at least one application session, have been seen be-
tween the last occurrence of r and a message of a type m. In
the Agobot example, login always occurs before messages
in the set Mlogin = {bot.dns,bot.status,mac.logout}.
Furthermore, only bot.dns and bot.status occur between
the last login and messages in the Mlogin set. Therefore, the
prerequisite .*login(bot.dns|bot.status)∗ will be added for
all three message types in Mlogin. We provide a more precise
description of our algorithm for inferring prerequisites in
Appendix A.
Once all prerequisites have been computed, we label each
state q of T with the set of message types that are allowed as
input in that state. A message type m is allowed in a state q if
the sequence of message types leading to q exactly matches
all prerequisites for m (since T is a tree, there is only one
path leading from the root to state q). The labeled state tree
for the Agobot example is shown in Figure 3.
Hitting set heuristic. The technique described above fails
to detect a prerequisite for a message m when there are
multiple, alternative paths to a state where m is allowed.
As an example, in an SMTP session, either HELO or
EHLO may be the ﬁrst message, but one of these two
is required before a RCPT TO message may be sent.
Furthermore, even if there is only one login message type
according to the speciﬁcation of a protocol, this message
type may be split into several clusters by our tool (for
instance, when the login message can have signiﬁcantly
different, optional parameters). To be able to handle such
situations, we generalize Equation 2 and infer prerequisites
in the form:
. ∗ (r1|..|rk)(a1|..|aj)∗ (3)
That is, we require only one of the messages r1,..,rk to be
present in a session before m can be received. To infer such
prerequisites, we generalize the algorithm described above,
as detailed in Appendix A.
End-state heuristic. In addition to the techniques described
previously, we also use a simple heuristic to detect end-states
in the protocol state machine. It is common for application
layer protocols to have one (or more) message types that
request the termination of the protocol session. To detect
those message types, we simply look for messages that,
throughout all observed application sessions, appear only
last in a session. In T, we mark all states that follow such
messages as end-states, setting their label to the empty set
(since no messages of any type are allowed in those states).
2.3.3. Exbar. Based on a state tree (APTA) that is labeled
by our heuristics, we can now infer a minimal DFA. The
problem of deriving the smallest DFA consistent with a
labeled training set is an important problem in grammar
inference, and has been proven NP-complete by Gold [32].
Both approximate and exact algorithms have been proposed
to solve it (see [31] for an up to date survey of existing tech-
niques). Exbar [21] is the state-of-the-art, exact algorithm for
minimal consistent DFA inference. Thus, we apply Exbar to
the state tree T, once it has been labeled by the previously-
discussed algorithm. The result is the generalized protocol
state machine.
The state machine for the Agobot example (Figure 3) is
shown in Figure 4. Here, we have once more replaced the
state labels with accept. Once this generalization phase is
complete, we assume that any sequence of message types
that leads to an unspeciﬁed state transition is not a valid
protocol session. Therefore, we add an additional reject state
(not shown in Figure 4) to the state machine, and make
it the endpoint for all unspeciﬁed transitions. In the state
machines shown throughout this work, this reject state is
also omitted for ease of presentation. In Section 3.5, we
evaluate the performance of Exbar on our datasets.{login}
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2.4. Creating Fuzzing Speciﬁcations
As a ﬁnal step, our tool is able to export the state machine
and message format descriptions to the XML-based protocol
speciﬁcation format used by the Peach fuzzing platform [19].
Fuzzing is a black-box software testing technique that
is based on the principle of feeding an application with
random input, while observing crashes or other undesired
behavior [33]. To achieve better code coverage of the tested
application, advanced fuzzers (such as Peach [19]) generate
test data based on the grammar of the ﬁle formats or
network messages understood by the target application (we
refer the reader to [34] for a recent overview of fuzzing
techniques). Unfortunately, without any knowledge of the
protocol state machine, a (stateful) network protocol cannot
be effectively fuzzed. The reason is that a server will
typically discard messages with types that are not acceptable
in the current protocol state. Thus, stateful protocol fuzzers
such as Snooze [35], additionally use a speciﬁcation of a
protocol state-machine to reach deep protocol states.
Prospex is able to automatically extract a grammar for
protocol messages, as well as a protocol state machine;
stateful, grammar-basedfuzzing is, therefore, a natural appli-
cation. We chose to leverage an existing tool for fuzz testing,
and selected Peach [19], mainly because it is an open-source
project under active development, and it provides most of
the required features. The main limitation of Peach was the
limited support for statefulness. To address this limitation,
we contributed to the design and development of improved
statefulness features for Peach, which have been integrated
into release 2.2. To use Prospex speciﬁcations for fuzzing,
we simply translate the message formats and state machine
extracted by our tool to Peach XML. The Peach fuzzing
framework then provides all the mechanisms necessary to
perform stateful fuzz testing of real-world applications that
implement the target protocol.
3. Evaluation
We have tested our tool on a number of applications that
implement stateful, application-layer protocols. In particular,
we chose a bot protocol, SMB, SMTP and SIP, as they are
all stateful protocols implemented in complex server appli-
cations that are widely deployed. Because of a limitation of
our current system (our taint tool only runs under Linux),
we only analyzed server programs that are available to us as
Linux binaries. However, this does not represent a general
limitation of our approach.
The quality of the speciﬁcations produced by our tool is
limited by the quality and variety of the data used to train it.
As for all trace-based approaches, our system cannot learn
behaviors that do not occur in the training data. For the
purpose of this evaluation, we trained our system using small
datasets that covered a meaningful subset of the functionality
of each protocol, such as using SIP to perform phone calls
or SMB to browse shared ﬁles and folders. The goal of this
evaluation is to demonstrate that, provided suitable training
data, we can produce accurate state machines and message
formats for complex, stateful protocols. Furthermore, our
tool can help a human malware analyst to understand a
previously-unknownmalware protocol.Finally, we show that
we can automatically generate fuzzing speciﬁcations that are
subsequently used to ﬁnd security vulnerabilities in real-
world server programs.
3.1. State Machine Inference
We applied our system to one malware protocol (Agobot
C&C), two text-based protocols (SMTP, SIP), and one bi-
nary protocol (SMB). For each protocol, the system created
state machines that ranged from four states (Agobot) to 13
states (SMB).
Agobot. We selected the well-known Agobot as the malware
example. The reason is that Agobot implements a custom
C&C protocol and is representative for a whole family
of bots, for example, Phatbot and Forbot [36]. For C&C,Agobot uses a text-based protocol that resembles the IRC
protocol. However, the malware author has extended the
protocol by incorporating additional command keywords.
These commands typically trigger malicious bot behavior,
for example, spreading via scanning and remote exploits,
relaying trafﬁc, or downloading binaries from the web. The
automatic analysis of bots can provide valuable information
about the malware’s communication protocol and the avail-
able commands, which can help an analyst to better and
faster understand the bot’s internal functionality.
For our experiments, we set up an IRC server and
conﬁgured an Agobot instance such that the bot connected
to a local IRC channel, listening for commands. We then
mimicked a bot herder, issuing several commands to the bot
while monitoring it. We then ran our tool on the collected
traces and obtained the state machine in Figure 5. Moreover,
the system has correctly produced format speciﬁcations for
the commands that we sent to the bot. Of course, for a more
realistic scenario, it would be desirable to trace the bot while
a real bot herder is issuing commands.
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Figure 5. Inferred state machine for Agobot command
and control protocol.
SMTP protocol. As an example of an application that
implements a stateful, text-based protocol, we have cho-
sen the widely-deployed mail transport agent sendmail
(version 8.13.8). The application implements SMTP (Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol). To infer the state machine, we ﬁrst
recorded 16 SMTP application sessions on our group’s e-
mail server. We then replayed this small training set to
a sendmail server instance that we were tracing. Figure 6
shows the SMTP state machine that our system inferred. It
can be seen that two different message types were created
for each the MAIL FROM and RCPT TO commands. This
is due to the fact that those mail clients that initially send
an EHLO command are typically using extended options
(additional ﬂags and keywords) in subsequent SMTP com-
mands (for example “ORCPT” in the RCPT TO command).
Because of the resulting, different message formats, our
system distinguishes between simple and extended versions
of these SMTP commands.
Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. As an example
of a complex, stateful, binary protocol, we have chosen
SMB/CIFS. In our experiments, we used version 3.0.26a
of the Samba software suite, and traced the smbd daemon
while using the smbclient utility to browse shared di-
rectories, performing common operations such as writing,
reading, and deleting ﬁles and directories. Using this setup,
we produced a training set of 31 recorded sessions. The
state machine inferred from the SMB dataset can be seen
in Figure 7. The login sequence leading to State 3 is
clearly visible. After that, when the DFS (distributed ﬁle
system) option is enabled, the client ﬁrst connects to the
IPC$ share to obtain a DFS referral for the requested share.
Otherwise, the client directly connects to the requested share
in State 6. In this state, most of the ﬁle system operations
are available. Operations on a ﬁle are performed by opening
the ﬁle, reading or writing, and ﬁnally closing it (States 8-
10). According to this state machine, only one ﬁle may be
opened at any given time. Of course, this is not a limitation
of the SMB/CIFS protocol, but a peculiarity of how the
smbclient tool employs it. In fact, smbclient always
closes a ﬁle before operating on the next one. Finally, notice
that States 11 and 12 are artifacts of our system, caused by
the limited variety of the training set. The reason is that, in
the training set, “DELETE” and “QUERY DISK” requests
were always preceded by ﬁnd requests. This highlights the
dependence of our system on the quality and variety of data
in the training set.
Session Initiation Protocol. The text-based Session Initia-
tion Protocol (SIP) [37] is used for setting up and controlling
communication connections. In our experiment, we traced
the well-known, open-source telephony server Asterisk
[38] (version 1.4.0), which is typically used as part of a
Voice-Over-IP (VOIP) infrastructure. Our test environment
consisted of three (virtual) machines, one of them running
the Asterisk server, while the two other additional machines
served as clients. In our test conﬁguration, we created two
SIP peers, each including a voice box. The client machines
had installed either CounterPath Corporation’s proprietary
softphone X-Lite [39] (version 2.0) or the open-source
softphone Ekiga [40] (version 2.11). To simulate different
client behavior, the softphones were conﬁgured to either
automatically answer incoming calls using a built-in auto-
answer feature, automatically answer after a short delay
(e.g., permit ringing) by using a GUI automation tool [41],
or to not answer at all (triggering the voice box). Then, we
initiated a number of phone calls to these peers by using a
softphone, including simultaneous phone calls on multiple
lines. These training calls were used by our tool to generate
protocol speciﬁcations for the observed call initialization
use-cases. Figure 8 shows the SIP state machine.
3.2. Quality of Protocol Speciﬁcations
To evaluate the quality of the protocol speciﬁcations
inferred by Prospex, we need to assess their soundness0
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and completeness. For the purpose of this paper, we say
that a protocol speciﬁcation is complete if it is not overly
restrictive. That is, the protocol speciﬁcation accepts (parses)
valid protocol sessions. Conversely, we say that a protocol
speciﬁcation is sound if it is not overly permissive. That is,
it rejects invalid protocol sessions.
As for all trace-based approaches, the completeness of
inferred speciﬁcations is limited by the variety of behaviors
observed in the training data. Therefore, we evaluate com-
pleteness with respect to the subset of protocol functionality
that was exercised during training. For instance, for the SMB
protocol we take into account the browsing of shared ﬁles
and directories, but not the use of printing services.
3.2.1. Protocol Completeness. In the ﬁrst step, we demon-
strate that our protocol speciﬁcations are complete. To this
end, we used our protocol speciﬁcations to parse real-world
network traces (that were not part of the training data)
of SMTP, SMB, and SIP trafﬁc . Note that this shows
the completeness of both the message formats and the
state machines inferred by our tool. The reason is that,
for successful parsing, Prospex has to correctly determine
the format of each individual message and recognize their
correct ordering.
For parsing, we used an enhanced version of the single
message parser presented in [17], which includes support for
multiple states. Each result was achieved by using the value
of k where the generalized Dunn index reaches its maximum
(as discussed in Section 2.2.2).
SMTP results. For SMTP, we recorded our group’s
Postfix [42] e-mail server trafﬁc (incoming trafﬁc on port
25) during a period of four weeks. Then, we split the dumps
into TCP sessions and parsed them, using the automatically-
generated SMTP protocol speciﬁcation with k = 10.
Out of 31,903 total sessions, we were able to parse 29,832
sessions (93.5%) successfully. We found that the remaining
2,071 sessions (6,5%) were all using TLS encryption, which
we cannot handle properly as one of the limitations of
our system is its inability to handle encrypted trafﬁc. This
shows that our system can fully parse (unencrypted) real-
world trafﬁc, generated by a number of clients and sent toa different mail server implementation than the one used to
infer the protocol speciﬁcations.
SMB results. To test our SMB protocol speciﬁcation, we
used smbclient to browse shared directories on both
Windows and Linux servers, and recorded 80 sessions. For
k = 23, only 8 sessions fail to parse. We examined these
sessions and determined that parsing fails because of (1)
error conditions not present in the training set (such as
attempting to read from a non-existing ﬁle), (2) writing of
long ﬁles; a limitation of our training set was that only
short ﬁles were written, small enough to be sent in a single
write message, and (3) insufﬁcient generalization of the state
machine (as discussed in Section 2.3, states 11 and 12 in
Figure 7 are artifacts of our system).
SIP results. For generating SIP trafﬁc, we used
X-Lite [39] to initiate phone calls to different SIP peers
in a laboratory Voice-Over-IP environment. We recorded a
set of 80 SIP sessions during these calls. Using the state
machine for the indicated optimum of k = 6, we were able
to parse all of the trafﬁc successfully.
3.2.2. Protocol Soundness. In the next step, we evaluate
the soundness of the inferred speciﬁcations.
Soundness of the Message Formats. To show that our
protocol speciﬁcations are not overly permissive, we ﬁrst
need to demonstrate that the inferred message format for
each cluster is not too general, as it should neither parse
arbitrary messages nor messages that have a different type.
To this end, we compute the message format speciﬁcity.
Initially, we manually label every message in the training
set with its actual message type (such as “HELO” or “TREE
CONNECT”). Then, we mark each cluster with the message
label of the majority of its messages (while, ideally, all
messages in a cluster would share the same label, this step is
necessary if different message types are incorrectly clustered
together). In the next step, we select a certain cluster. Then,
we ﬁnd all training set messages that are not labeled with
the label of this cluster. These messages are then parsed
with the cluster’s message format. When the clustering phase
was successful and the message formats are sound (not too
general), we would expect most parsing attempts to fail. This
step is then repeated for all clusters. Finally, we calculate the
ratio r of successfully parsed messages to the number of total
parsing attempts. The format speciﬁcity is then computed as
1 − r.
For the value of k where the Dunn index reaches its
maximum, our tool achieves a message format speciﬁcity
of 1 for all four datasets (Agobot, SMTP, SMB and SIP).
This means that (a) no cluster contains messages of multiple
types, and (b) the message format for a cluster does not parse
any messages of a different type.
Soundness of the State Machines. The next goal is to
evaluate the soundness of the inferred state machines. To do
so, we require a reference state machine for each protocol.
We created these reference state machines manually, using
information from speciﬁcation documents (if available), and
integrating it with our own testing and reverse engineering
efforts. Clearly, our tool cannot learn parts of the protocol
that were not exercised in our training data, so we do not
include them in the reference state machine. We then per-
formed n (for n = 50,000) random walks over our inferred
state machine, generating n sessions that our speciﬁcation
considers valid. These sessions were fed to the reference
state machines. The idea is that an overly permissive state
machine would generate sessions that are not recognized by
the true protocol. We found that, for all four protocols, all
sessions were accepted. Thus, our inferred state machines
are sound.
3.3. Comparative Evaluation
The previous section has shown that our techniques allow
us to infer accurate speciﬁcations. However, there exist
alternative approaches to infer an automaton from positive
examples only. One popular approach is based on the
minimum message length (MML) principle [43]. According
to this principle, a solution should minimize the length of
the description of the state machine together with the dataset
it tries to account for. Since minimizing this quantity is an
NP-complete problem, several approximate algorithms have
been proposed to attempt to solve it. The sk-strings algo-
rithm [44] is one such algorithm, which has previously been
applied to mine speciﬁcations [45] of a software component
from program execution traces. The authors of [44] also
introduced the beams algorithm [46], which outperforms sk-
strings. We obtained the implementations of both algorithms
from the authors [47].
To compare the performance of previous techniques with
our system, we leverage the precision and recall metrics in-
troduced in [48]. Precision is closely related to the soundness
metric described in the previous section. It measures the ratio
of sequences generated by a random walk over the inferred
automaton that are accepted by the reference automaton.
Conversely, recall measures the ratio of sequences generated
by the reference automaton that are accepted by the inferred
automaton. It is a measure of completeness. For details on
how these metrics are computed, we refer the reader to [48].
Results are shown in Table 1. For sk-strings, we show
results using the OR heuristic (which was the best performer
in [44]) and the AND heuristic (which is evaluated in [48]).
We run sk-strings with tail lengths of 1,2 and 3 and s =
0.5,0.75,1, and select the best solution based on MML.
Similarly, we run the beams algorithm with beam widths
of 1,2,4,8,16 and 32.
Prospex clearly outperforms previous tools on all four
datasets. The sk-strings algorithm using the OR heuristic
does not produce sound results on most datasets (P ≃ 0.12).Sk-strings with the AND heuristic and beams produce better
results. However, only Prospex consistently provides a sound
state machine (P = 1). Previous algorithms over-generalize
on at least one dataset. Somewhat surprisingly, neither sk-
strings nor beams succeed in learning a state machine for
the rather simple Agobot dataset.
Agobot SMTP SMB SIP
P R P R P R P R
Prospex 1 1 1 1 1 .58 1 1
beams .56 1 .89 1 1 .50 1 1
skstrings(and) .79 .20 1 .88 1 .30 1 .01
skstrings(or) .11 .92 .11 1 .12 .62 1 1
Table 1. Precision (P) and Recall (R) of inferred
automata with respect to reference automaton.
3.4. Robustness of k
In this section, we examine the robustness of our tool to
the choice of the parameter k, the number of message types
(clusters) that need to be provided as input to the clustering
algorithm. The number of clusters is a trade-off between
soundness and completeness. With too many clusters, we
expect the inferred model to be sound but over-speciﬁc,
and therefore incomplete. Conversely, with too few clusters,
we expect a complete but over-permissive (unsound) model.
We wish to demonstrate that, for a relatively large range
of values for k, Prospex produces a sound and complete
protocol speciﬁcation. Therefore, we measure the following
two properties over a range of values for k:
Parsing success rate. To compute this property, we use
the generated protocol speciﬁcation for each k to parse
network traces of real-world trafﬁc, and measure the ratio of
successfully parsed sessions to the total number of sessions.
This is a measure of completeness, so we expect it to to
decrease as k increases.
Message format speciﬁcity. This is the property introduced
in Section 3.2.2. It is a measure of soundness, so we expect
this property to increase as k increases. The reason is that
more clusters imply fewer messages per cluster, so the
message formats for each cluster become more speciﬁc.
In Figure 9, we show both properties for the SMTP and
SMB protocols over a range of values for k. In addition,
the ﬁgures show the generalized Dunn index, which, as
described in Section 2.2.2, is used to choose the value of
k. The Dunn index is normalized to the (0,1) range. It can
be seen that the maximum of the Dunn index correlates with
the optimal choice of k with regard to parsing quality and
message speciﬁcity. This conﬁrms that the Dunn index is a
good predictor to select k, resulting in protocol speciﬁcations
that are speciﬁc and successful in parsing.
Speciﬁcally, in Figure 9(a), the Dunn index reaches its
maximum at k = 10. This corresponds to the optimal parsing
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Figure 9. Robustness of k
results and a message format speciﬁcity of 1, which demon-
strates the suitability of our approach. Similarly, Figure 9(b)
shows that values of k around the choice of 23 (between
22 and 25) produce high parsing results, while having a
message format speciﬁcity of 1.
3.5. Exbar Performance
We allowed Exbar to run for up to 5 minutes for each
value of k, and were able to infer state machines of up to
25 states (starting from state trees with over 200 states).
For the optimal values of k, selected using the Dunn index,
Exbar terminated in less than 0.03 seconds for all of our test
cases. Nonetheless, for very large values of k, Exbar might
not terminate in the allotted time. In such cases, approximate
algorithms could be used instead [31], but a better solution
is to increase the size of the training set, since DFA learning
is harder when the training set is sparse (as was empirically
demonstrated by the Abbadingo competition [49]).3.6. Fuzzing Experiments
As discussed in Section 2.4, our system can be used to
create input speciﬁcations for the Peach fuzzer. This allows
the fuzzer to use the automatically inferred state machine
while fuzzing the message’s ﬁeld values according to the
inferred ﬁeld types.
SMB fuzzing. We automatically converted the protocol
speciﬁcations generated by Prospex for the SMB/CIFS pro-
tocol into more than 2,100 lines of Peach XML. This allowed
us to use Peach to fuzz the latest versions of the Samba
server and the Windows XP SMB/CIFS implementation.
Unfortunately, we did not ﬁnd any vulnerabilities in these
programs. This may be due to the fact that both are mature,
widely-deployed services that have been patched for many
vulnerabilities related to input validation errors in the past.
Therefore, we target an older version of Samba (version
3.0.2a, which is subject to an arbitrary ﬁle access vulnerabil-
ity [50]) to validate our tool. By searching the network traces
captured during the fuzzing run, we were able to verify
that the fuzzer had been able to ﬁnd the vulnerability. More
speciﬁcally, the fuzzer downloaded the /etc/passwd ﬁle,
which should not have been accessible through the SMB
service. The /etc/passwd ﬁle is commonly used to test
for ﬁle traversal vulnerabilities on UNIX variants. Notice
that successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires the
fuzzer to navigate deep into the protocol state machine (to
State 10 in Figure 7). Furthermore, this attack is only possi-
ble because the message format inference has automatically
identiﬁed a ﬁeld in the “OPEN” message as a ﬁle name.
Peach only makes directory traversal attempts on ﬁelds that
are marked as ﬁle names.
SIP fuzzing. We generated fuzzing speciﬁcations for SIP
and ran the Peach fuzzer on the Asterisk server. After
checking the fuzzer logs, we noticed that sending the server
an “OK” message with status code “0” triggered a segmen-
tation fault that crashed Asterisk. This could be used to
launch a denial-of-service (DOS) attack. For the server to
successfully accept and parse the message that crashes it,
the fuzzer has to navigate successfully to State 4 in the SIP
state machine (shown in Figure 8). Finding vulnerabilities of
this kind by using stateless fuzzing is practically infeasible.
Even though we found this to be a known vulnerability [51]
that has already been addressed in the newest versions of
Asterisk, it shows that our system is capable of creating
fuzzing speciﬁcations that can be used to automatically ﬁnd
vulnerabilities in real-world software.
4. Related Work
Protocol reverse engineering is not a new concept. Since
proprietary, closed protocols started to emerge on the In-
ternet (e.g., such as the OSCAR protocol, used by ICQ
and AIM [52]), there has been interest to reverse engineer
these protocols with the goal of providing free, open-source
alternatives. For example, Samba [53] aims to offer a free
implementation of the Microsoft SMB/CIFS ﬁle sharing
protocol. Although popular, protocol reverse engineering is
still a largely manual task. It is tedious and labor-intensive.
Session replay. The ﬁrst automated protocol analysis ap-
proaches emerged within the context of honeypots. In order
to capture malicious code that delivers its payload after a
series of interactions over the network, researchers started
working on systems that could replay application sessions
automatically. To this end, systems such as RolePlayer [12]
and ScriptGen [13], [14] analyze network trafﬁc and attempt
to generalize the traces so that correct replies can be
generated to new requests. Although useful, the main focus
of these systems is not to reverse engineer and understand
the entire protocol that is analyzed, but to continue the
interaction with a malicious program long enough so that its
payload can be intercepted. Hence, these systems only focus
on the protocol format to the extent necessary for replay, in
particular, on the recognition of ﬁelds that contain cookie
values or IP addresses. ScriptGen is the only previous work
that attempts a kind of state machine inference. However,
the proposed technique is limited because no generalization
takes place. Thus, the resulting state machine is a tree,
similar to the APTA in Section 2.3.1, which can only parse
sessions identical to those previously observed.
Protocol analysis. Reacting to the emerging need for the au-
tomated analysis and reverse engineering of entire protocols,
systems were proposed that attempt to discover the complete
protocol format. In [54], the authors propose to apply bio-
informatics techniques (such as sequencing algorithms) to
network trafﬁc. The goal of the system is to identify protocol
structure and ﬁelds with different semantics. In [11], an
improved technique was proposed that uses recursive and
type-based clustering instead of byte-wise alignment. The
advantage of such network trace-based approaches is that
it is straightforward to gather large datasets for training.
Their shortcoming is that network traces provide a limited
amount of information and no information on ﬁeld seman-
tics, making classiﬁcation of messages into types extremely
challenging.
Recently, four approaches were presented that propose
to extract protocol information by observing the execution
of a program while it processes input messages [15]–[18].
However, these systems focus on reversing message formats,
and leave state machine inference for future work.
Speciﬁcation mining. Automatically extracting a protocol
state machine from a set of observed protocol interactions is
related to the problem of extracting temporal speciﬁcations
for software components (such as API or method call
sequences) from program traces [45], [55]–[58]. Here, we
focus on how work in this ﬁeld performs state machineinference. In [55], each relevant event is directly mapped
to a state in the automaton. This approach is not suitable
for protocol inference, where typically there exist message
types that are valid in many different states (such as the
“ALIVE” message in Figure 8). In [45], the sk-strings
algorithm is used to infer a state machine. As discussed
in Section 3.3, this algorithm does not provide acceptable
performance for most of our datasets. Other works [56],
[57] only infer properties conforming to simple patterns,
such as alternation between two events. Finally, [58] uses
an active learning approach, and learns state machines
using the L∗ algorithm [59]. The L∗ algorithm requires a
teacher that can answer membership queries. In [58], the
teacher is implemented using model checking techniques.
This approach cannot be easily applied to network protocol
inference.
Automated white-box testing. Performing fuzzing of an
application based on an automatically reverse-engineered
network protocol is related to concolic testing [60], white-
box fuzzing [61], [62], and related approaches [63], [64].
These techniques leverage symbolic execution of a target
application to generate test cases that provide better code
coverage than black-box fuzzing approaches. They have
been successfully applied to a wide variety of software
such as Linux ﬁle system implementations [65], the entire
GNU coreutils [64], and the JavaScript interpreter of Internet
Explorer 7 [62]. To the best of our knowledge, none of these
tools have yet been applied to real-world implementations
of stateful network protocols. Also, we believe that these
techniques are complementary to ours. That is, symbolic
execution could be added to Prospex to overcome some
of its limitations, such as its inability to express arbitrary
relationships between protocol ﬁelds. Conversely, the pro-
tocol speciﬁcations generated by Prospex could be used to
enhance white-box fuzzing of complex network applications
by leveraging a grammar-based constraint solver [62].
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented Prospex, a system to automat-
ically extract application layer protocol speciﬁcations. Our
system monitors the execution of a (server) program that
processes network input. Based on the recorded execution
traces, the tool produces accurate message format speciﬁ-
cations for different types of messages and a generalized
protocol state machine.
Our technique proceeds in three main steps: First, we split
application sessions into individual messages and extract
their formats. The second step is responsible for clustering
similar messages. The notion of similarity is established not
only by comparing message formats, but also by analyzing
the overall behavior of the server in reaction to each input.
Based on the clusters, we can assign a type to each message,
a process that required manual analysis in previous work.
Finally, the third step infers a generalized protocol state
machine that reﬂects the sequences in which messages may
be exchanged.
Our experiments demonstrate that the presented approach
works well in practice. Our system can analyze real-world
programs, producing speciﬁcations for complex protocols
such as SMB/CIFS. Moreover, our system is able to help
malware analysts by automatically reverse-engineering a
non-standard protocol used by a malicious bot program. Ad-
ditionally, our system can create detailed input speciﬁcations
for a stateful fuzzer.
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Appendix A: Prerequisites Inference Algorithm
In this section, we detail the algorithms that we use
to infer the prerequisites described in Section 2.3.2. Al-
gorithm 1, together with Algorithms 2 and 3, computes
prerequisites in the form of Equation 2. A prerequisite for
message type m is speciﬁed by the tuple  m,r,Ar . To
implement the hitting set heuristic and to infer prerequisites
in the form of Equation 3, we replace the call to the
get_required function in Algorithm 1 with a call to
get_required_sets (Algorithm 4).
The hitting_set function in Algorithm 4 ﬁnds a
solution to the minimum hitting set problem for sets in Y .
That is, it ﬁnds the smallest set ρ of message labels such that
ρ∩y  = ∅, ∀y ∈ Y . That is, we want to ﬁnd the minimum
number of message types such that at least one type is
present on any path from the start state to a state where
m is received. The minimum hitting set problem is NP-
complete [66], but we impose the restriction |ρ| ≤ K and
solve it by exhaustive search. The constant K was set to 5 in
our experiments; we do not expect a protocol speciﬁcation
to have more than 5 message types leading to the same state
transition, or our clustering algorithm to be so inaccurate as
to split messages of a single message type into more than
5 clusters. Since get_required_sets returns a set of
sets, Algorithms 1 and 3 must also be modiﬁed accordingly.
Algorithm 1 infer_prerequisites
Input: The set of message types M. The training set
composed of n application sessions S1,..,Sn, where
Si = σi,1,..σi,|Si| and σi,j ∈ M.
Result: the set of prerequisites P.
for each m ∈ M do
Rm = get required(m)
R =
T
m∈M Rm
P = ∅
for each r ∈ R do
Mr = m ∈ M|r ∈ Rm // the set of messages which
share requirement r
Ar = get allowed(r,Mr)
for each m ∈ Mr do
add  m,r,Ar  to P
Algorithm 2 get_required
Input: A message type m ∈ M. The training set S1,..,Sn.
Result: Rm ⊂ M, the set of msg. types required before m
Y = ∅
for each instance σi,j of m in the training set do
y = {σi,1,..,σi,j−1}
// the set of message types found before σi,j in Si
add y to Y
return
T
y∈Y
Algorithm 3 get_allowed
Input: A message type r ∈ M. A set of message types
Mr ⊂ M. The training set S1,..,Sn.
Result: A ⊂ M, the set of message types allowed after r
A = ∅
for each instance σi,j of m in the training set do
consider the application session Si =
σi,1,..,r,σi,k+1,..,σi,j,.. // σi,k = r is the last
occurrence of r in Si before σi,j
a = {σi,k+1,..,σi,j−1}
add a to A
return A
Algorithm 4 get_required_sets
Input: A message type m ∈ M. The training set S1,..,Sn.
Result: Rm ⊂ 2M, the set of requirements for m
Rm = ∅
compute Y as in get required
while (y  = ∅ ∀y ∈ Y ) do
ρ = hitting set(Y )
add ρ to Rm
set y to y − ρ for each y ∈ Y
return Rm